I am a tenure-track Assistant Professor at Pompeu Fabra University (UPF) and at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (GSE).
Research Keywords: Financial Accounting, Corporate Finance, Corporate Transparency/Disclosure.
Address: Jaume I Building, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, Of. 20.1E66, Barcelona, Spain.
- “When more is preferred to less: Multifamily firms and firm performance” with Patricio Duran. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice (2019)
Manuscripts under Review
- "Financial Disclosure Environment and the Liquidity Risk of Private Firms"
- This work has been presented at the FMA European Conference 2019, and at seminars in the Pompeu Fabra University, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus School of Economics, IESEG School of Business, and WHU- Otto Beisheim School of Management.
- “Death and Taxes: how do Inheritance Tax and Shareholder Protection affect the market value of Family Firms” with Matias Braun, Michael Carney, Patricio Duran, and Julio Riutort.
- This paper has been selected as a finalist for the Best Paper Award in the Academy of International Business – Latin America Chapter meeting (2018), and presented in the Academy of International Business Conference (2018).
Work in Progress
- “Consequences of Financial Disclosure Regulation on M&A activity” with Francisco Urzúa, Peter Caspar and Paolo Volpin.
- We analyze the effects of disclosure environment on the corporate control market. The economic analysis of tentative M&A deals requires information that is costly to get. Mandatory disclosure regulations, by making public the access to financial disclosures that otherwise would be unrevealed, reduce the cost for getting that information. However, it is not clear if the lower information friction would lead to an increase in the M&A activity. In fact, the higher level of transparency can also fuel the investors competition, increasing the target price, and therefore, reducing the deal profit. Moreover, part of the intangibles and other firms’ key values are not included in mandated disclosure requirements. In this context, we aim to empirically address the following questions: Does the disclosure regulation fuel M&A activity? Which country’ or industry’ characteristics shape this effect? Does the lower information friction affect the deals’ financing structure? Do the smaller firms benefit more from this searching cost reduction, or are they the (previously hided) target?
- Currently, we are evaluating these questions using a sample of M&A deals in 12 European Countries for the period between 2003 and 2011.
- “Does the Mandatory Financial Disclosure Regulation fuel the Executive Labor Market?" with Francisco Urzúa.
- We study the consequences of disclosure regulation in the CEOs labor market. We conjecture that disclosure regulations can promote this market via two mechanisms. First, the set of peers’ disclosures helps to distinguish if the performance outcome is driven by factors related to the executive’s talent or by industry-wide shocks. Second, mandatory disclosures facilitate the searching and assessment of potential replacement executives. The higher transparency eases the matching between firm’s skill demands and skill supply of executives.
- To evaluate this hypothesis, we are building the dataset about CEOs' turnover and salary from European private firms.
- “Trade-credit risk and Mandatory disclosures”
- I plan to evaluate the role of the disclosure regulation in the supply-chain financing. Most of the literature about disclosure regulation has focused in the capital-markets side of the external finance. However, empirical studies show that suppliers provide the biggest portion of short-term financing. The set of mandatory disclosures constitute a reliable and standardized source of information, which has the potential effect to increase the accuracy in the analysis of clients’ solvency-risk. This potential effect brings interesting consequences for the diffusion of economic shocks through supply chain and also in the role of trade-credit as a substitute for bank-credit.